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Abstract 
This article presents new data on the emergence and growth of the leading West 
European poultry industries after 1945. It shows that those countries where poultry 
output grew most quickly – especially the UK, Italy and Spain – were also the 
countries where the agricultural sectors adopted US technologies and US agribusiness 
organizational structures most vigorously. Elsewhere in West Europe, poultry output 
grew much less quickly and the adoption of agribusiness structures lagged behind. By 
contrast, the poultry sector in the USSR was based on the Soviet collectivist system. 
This was the largest poultry sector in Europe, but also much less efficient. The article 
suggests therefore that the diffusion of the agribusiness type of organization of 
agriculture and the increase in poultry output were deeply entwined across Europe, 
with potentially important consequences for the different roles and impacts of 
agribusiness in Europe.  
 
 
 
On 28 May 1964, the President of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, visited the 
Cobb Breeding Company’s stand in the British Agricultural Pavilion in the Park of 
Economic Achievement of the People of the USSR in Moscow. There he marveled at 
the genetic advances that enabled Cobb-bred broiler chickens to be so productive. 
Historians recently discovered that the encounter prompted Khrushchev to write a 
long memorandum to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, admonishing Soviet scientists for being insufficiently 
attentive to solving the problems of Soviet agriculture. Given the Cold War context, 
Khrushchev’s rebuke was remarkable, praising the ‘capitalists’ of Cobb, who, by 
contrast, represented ‘a high minded approach to poultry husbandry’.1 
 The episode is revealing because Khrushchev’s response to the Cobb broiler 
chicken was borne out of the deep crisis in Soviet farming in 1963 and 1964. While 
little was known about it at the time in the West, Soviet grain production suffered 
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during a prolonged drought in 1963, and, in the absence of feed grains, Soviet poultry 
meat output fell by a quarter in 1964 (see Table 1 below).
2
 Collectivism appeared to 
be less successful at providing food than capitalism, and partly, according to 
Khrushchev’s memo, because of the relative failings of Soviet science.  
 However, the capitalist agriculture that had produced the Cobb broiler chicken 
was markedly different to the capitalist organization of agriculture that had been 
prevalent only a few years earlier. It was Cobb, and indeed the poultry sector as a 
whole, according to the renowned British agricultural commentator, Geoffrey Sykes, 
that was responsible for introducing the term agribusiness into Europe.
3
 Agribusiness 
was an American term, coined to describe a critically important innovation in the 
organisation of food production, the rapid move to vertical integration and increasing 
use of technology in many areas of US agriculture in the 1950s. It was this form of 
capitalist agriculture that had prompted Khrushchev’s admiration. 
 After an extended visit to Harvard in 1952, Sykes had come away impressed 
with the US poultry sector.
4
 While at Harvard, Sykes must have attended some early 
lectures by John H Davis, who created the Agribusiness programme at Harvard 
Business School from 1955.
5
 Davis was articulating the view that applying new 
technology within larger and more integrated firms held significant advantages for 
agricultural producers in marketing. While it was widely understood that increasing 
investment in technology and exploiting economies of scale led to production 
efficiencies, the advantages of the agribusiness model lay more in the ability it gave 
producers to reduce price volatility. The risks faced by small producers in selling 
agricultural output in spot-markets were well understood. Indeed both Soviet 
Collectivization and the late nineteenth-century agricultural co-operative movements 
in Europe can be understood partly as organizational responses to the problems of 
marketing perishable foods.
6
 Agribusiness was a new response to an old problem.  
 Agribusiness diffused throughout western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. 
This coincided with the development of the EEC, and so agribusiness became a 
central element in the growing controversies surrounding the Common Agricultural 
Policy in the 1980s, on whether European policy had been captured by large 
corporations rather than rural societies, for example.
7
 As agribusiness organizational 
structures spread around Europe, it also became apparent that there were differences 
between countries’ industrializing food supply systems.8 These differences in 
organizational structures in turn influenced the positions adopted by different EEC 
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nations in policy debates. Understanding the origins and development of agribusiness 
in Europe may therefore contribute to a better appreciation of both the evolution of 
food systems within Europe and their relationship with the policy debates and 
controversies in European agriculture over the past half century. The origins of this 
organizational innovation in the United States can be traced to dairying and fruit 
growing. But this article follows Geoffrey Sykes’ observation that the birth of 
agribusiness in Europe was associated with the diffusion of the broiler chicken. 
 The article presents new data on the emergence and growth of the leading 
European poultry industries after 1945, and shows that those countries where poultry 
output grew most quickly – especially the UK, Italy and Spain – were also the 
countries where the agricultural sectors adopted both US technologies (like the Cobb 
broiler chicken) and US agribusiness organizational structures most vigorously. 
Elsewhere in Europe, where co-operatives remained influential, or where central 
wholesale markets remained important as clearing houses, poultry output grew much 
less quickly. The article suggests therefore that the diffusion of the agribusiness type 
of organization of agriculture and the increase in poultry output were, as Sykes 
claimed was the case for the UK, deeply entwined across Europe, with potentially 
important consequences for the different roles and impacts of agribusiness across 
European nations.  
 In the next section, the article returns to Khrushchev marveling at the Cobb 
broiler chicken in Moscow in May, 1964. While the Soviet poultry industry was then 
the largest in Europe by some distance, it had been dramatically overtaken by the US 
poultry sector, with its novel broiler chicken breeds, during the 1950s. The following 
section is a data-driven exercise in identifying the exact periods that broiler chicken 
output began to take off in western Europe. This is then followed by a discussion of 
the different institutional paths taken by the emerging poultry industry centres of 
Europe, contrasting the British agribusiness model (in Section III) with the 
cooperative association models that remained so influential in northern Europe 
(Section IV) but which saw only relatively slow growth in poultry output, before 
going on to consider (in Section V) a group of countries that moved from very 
traditional farming to agribusiness systems in poultry very quickly – it was these 
economies that went on to become western Europe’s leading centres for poultry 
industry output by 1973. Section VI concludes with a discussion and  
suggestions for further research. 
  4 
 
I 
Khrushchev’s Cobb memorandum was a footnote in the growing crisis in Soviet 
agricultural production, a crisis which contributed to Khrushchev being deposed and 
replaced by Leonid Brezhnev in October 1964. USSR poultry output was already 
enormous in the 1930s, and by 1961 it dominated the rest of Europe (see Table 1). 
Soviet poultry farming was organized around large flocks of dual-purpose birds, 
producing both eggs and meat, the meat either from redundant cockerel chicks or, 
more frequently, spent laying hens. Poultry farming had increased quickly in the 
1930s, with poultry meat providing significant export earnings.
9
 During World War 
Two the USSR poultry population fell by half, but then quickly recovered.
10
 By 1961 
Soviet egg production totaled 23.5 billion, twice that of the UK, and three times that 
of France.
11
 But the increase in the scale of output masked underlying problems in the 
efficiency of Soviet poultry farming. Poultry farming on any scale is dependent on 
animal feeds, and the Soviet agricultural model was increasingly unable to deliver the 
necessary surpluses over human grain consumption required for animal feed to remain 
cheap. USSR feed costs were estimated to be more than 50 per cent higher than in the 
US in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
12
 Moreover, dual-purpose chickens took much 
longer to reach slaughter weight than the increasingly efficient US broilers.
13
 More 
expensive feed fed to birds for a longer period added up to Soviet poultry meat prices 
in 1960 being estimated as five times higher than in the US.
14
 When Khrushchev 
focused on what to him seemed the remarkable feed conversion ratio of the Cobb 
broiler chicken, of around two pounds of feed required to produce each pound of 
poultry meat, it reflected his acute awareness of the vulnerability of the Soviet 
agricultural system to increasingly perilous grain output. 
 From an American perspective, however, the irony of Khrushchev latching on 
to the Cobb broiler was undoubtedly that other breeds were even more productive and 
commercially successful during the 1950s.
15
 These included Vantress, Hubbard, 
Arbor Acres and, of particular importance for the emerging European poultry 
industries, Nichols.
16
 Nichols strains delivered such superior feed conversion ratios 
that they priced competing strains out of the market. With feed costs forming 60 to 70 
per cent of the total costs of rearing birds, the feed conversion rate was the single 
most important indicator of commercial viability. Nichols birds also had low 
mortality rates and, critically, produced meat that European consumers were 
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increasingly happy to eat, as can be inferred from Table 1.
17
 Nichols distributed its 
birds across western Europe through its two European subsidiaries, Chunky Chicks 
(Nichols) located just outside Edinburgh and Nichols Lohrmann of Cuxhaven, near 
Hamburg, West Germany, and several franchisees. 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
Table 1 confirms that the Soviet chicken meat production ran at a higher level 
than any of its West European peers until the early 1960s (and again after its 1964 
crisis). Table 1 also shows how poultry output began to increase rapidly in the late 
1950s and 1960s in all West European countries. Some countries, notably the UK, 
Italy and Spain, saw their poultry sectors grow from very small beginnings to become 
European leaders by 1973. By contrast French output, initially the largest in western 
Europe by some distance, suffered a sharp collapse in the mid- to late-1960s, only 
exceeding its 1965 output by 1972. Finally it is worth noting that several countries, 
including Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden, all began with 
established poultry sectors in the 1950s but experienced only relatively slow growth 
(even decline) in output over the period. By 1973 the leading poultry meat producers 
in western Europe were Italy, France, Spain and the UK, the production of which, in 
aggregate, exceeded the output from the Soviet industry. 
 
II 
While Table 1 gives a clear picture of broiler chicken output in Europe by 1973, 
making any similar inferences about the late 1950s and early 1960s may be 
problematic. Partly this is because statistics of poultry output before the early 1960s 
were only haphazardly collected across Europe.
18
 But mostly it is because of the 
inability to disaggregate the new meat producing broilers from the traditional table 
poultry output within these figures, at least until the broiler flocks became utterly 
dominant everywhere after, say, 1964 or 1965.  
 Before the late-1950s, the European poultry population was overwhelmingly a 
population of egg-laying, not meat-producing, birds. Meat production was a by-
product of the egg business. The additional income received for chicken meat from 
spent layers and redundant cockerels was not insignificant, and had the effect of 
subsidizing egg prices somewhat.
19
 But in western Europe until the late 1950s the 
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specialized meat-producing sector was very small. Instead European poultry farmers 
overwhelmingly focused on these dual-purpose birds and so followed what the OECD 
described as ‘traditional’ poultry-farming methods.20 Specialist chicken meat 
production was confined to smallholders in a few regions (notably in southern 
England, France and Italy) where chicken cramming was a traditional trade.
21
 The 
imperative to adopt agribusiness organizational structures only arrived with broilers.  
 The very first broilers introduced to Europe were a small number of Nichols 
birds brought into Scotland by Rupert Chalmers Watson (of Chunky Chicks) in 1949. 
Numbers remained trivially small until the mid-1950s, when broiler growing began to 
increase in the UK, followed then by experiments in Netherlands, Germany, 
Scandinavia and Italy. The increase in these countries’ poultry populations from the 
late 1950s, was almost entirely attributable to the growth in broiler chickens, not dual-
purpose birds, nor specialist egg-laying birds, and so was associated with the first 
attempts to adopt US technologies and organizational structures.  
 While there was considerable experimentation with local strains, increasingly 
from the late 1950s, these additional meat producing flocks were stocked with US 
broiler strains.
22
 As far as interpreting Table 1 is concerned, this means that the share 
of each country’s poultry population that was composed of broilers was growing from 
a very small base, but at different rates and different start dates in the late 1950s. 
Table 1 above is therefore an incomplete guide to identifying where poultry-related 
agribusiness emerged first in Europe. For that we need to identify the growth of the 
broiler populations in these countries more carefully.  
 Table 2 presents what are very imperfect data, but are nevertheless the best 
estimates available of the broiler populations in the leading West European centres 
from 1956 to 1963. This shows that the economies that led Europe into broiler 
production were the UK, followed by Italy and then Spain. The next section turns to 
consider the UK example in more detail. 
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
III 
Agribusiness emerged first in Europe in the British poultry industry. This can partly 
be observed in the emergence of very high concentration ratios in the poultry industry 
from the late-1950s onwards when compared to any other agricultural sector, and 
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partly in the emergence of some very large, fully integrated, poultry firms. Already in 
the mid-1950s the disappearance of the small farmer was becoming widely 
acknowledged.
23
 K. E. Hunt’s report on the European Poultry industries for the 
OECD mentioned that already by 1960 less than three dozen groups were responsible 
for sixty per cent of total output. These were still overwhelmingly relatively small 
firms, but one, Buxted, was alone responsible for a quarter of total output and was 
growing quickly to become a sizeable food company in its own right.
24
 
 After an initial period of experimentation in the broiler industry until the end 
of the 1950s, the pace of consolidation increased rapidly. Buxted began by acquiring 
several smaller producers in the south of England in the late 1950s and in 1960 
MacFisheries, Unilever’s fish and poultry retailer, made a tentative start to integration 
through acquiring a few processing stations and groups of farmers. But it was in May 
1961 that, in the words of the trade journal Poultry Farmer and Packer, ‘the age of 
integration’ began when Ross acquired the breeding company Sterling Poultry 
Products.
25
 Within three years the British poultry sector underwent a dramatic 
consolidation, led by Ross. Along with Findus and Unilever’s Birdseye, Ross 
dominated the British frozen foods sector and the driving force at Ross was Alex 
Alexander, who wanted to diversify away from frozen fish and saw great 
opportunities in broilers. In 1962 Ross first acquired Spinks (another breeding 
company of laying hens), and then in September it acquired Fairbairn (a Carlisle 
based breeder of laying hens) and, crucially for its broiler interests, Chunky Chicks 
(Nichols), to become the largest poultry concern in Europe. Spillers, with its large 
animal feeds division, acquired a twenty per cent stake in Buxted also in 1962. Fitch 
Lovell, one of the emerging regional grocery supermarket groups, acquired 
substantial processing interests to become vertically integrated in its poultry division. 
That same year the Fatstock Marketing Corporation invested in a new, large 
processing station, especially to serve Cooperative Retail Society outlets. In 1963, the 
Vesteys’ Union International group, with its huge Dewhirst and Eastman chains of 
retail butchers, acquired a 50 per cent stake in Sun Valley, and the feed company, 
Bibby, acquired a large minority stake in J. P. Wood. The final acts in this episode 
were when the feed company Nitrovit muscled Spillers out of its minority stake in the 
Buxted concern, and J & B Eastwood (then Europe’s largest egg producer) diversified 
into broiler production during 1963 and early 1964.
26
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<Table 3 about here> 
 
Ten years before there had been no broiler chicken industry, merely a few 
experiments in chicken meat production by several dozens of small-scale farmers in 
the immediate aftermath of the derationing of animal feeds in 1953.
27
 But between 
May 1961 and February 1964 the entire UK broiler sector in the UK was totally 
restructured, and moved from a somewhat disaggregated to a highly concentrated and 
integrated industry. By 1964 the UK poultry industry was dominated by eight large 
food processing firms, with the leading four now responsible for half of total output. 
The leading firms were responsible for co-ordinating production from the hatching of 
both parent stock and the flocks reared for meat, through to all components of the 
rearing and processing of these birds in now massive flocks, in what had become a 
highly capital-intensive concentrated industry. This represented a dramatic 
transformation of the structure of what had become an important branch of British 
agriculture. Poultry sector output totaled 16 per cent of total British agricultural 
output already by 1960.
28
 It signaled the initial diffusion of the agribusiness structure 
into British agriculture. When Imperial Tobacco acquired first Ross and then Buxted 
in late 1969 and early 1970, this new group, together with Eastwood, controlled over 
60 per cent of the UK poultry sector. No other branch of British agriculture by then 
displayed anything like a similar level of concentration. The poultry industry was 
integrated, exploited economies of scale and high levels of capital intensity in its 
attempt to minimize price volatility in marketing. As Sykes had claimed earlier, the 
agribusiness structure emerged and reached maturity in the UK first in the poultry 
sector. 
 Agribusiness in the UK poultry sector was also the first case of agribusiness 
structures becoming significant within western Europe as a whole. Agribusiness 
structures were adopted elsewhere in western European poultry industries, but they 
lagged behind the UK. The explanation why the UK poultry industry was the first in 
Europe to adopt US agribusiness structures is not simply one rooted in the growth in 
poultry output. Italian output quickly exceeded that of the UK, for instance, and by 
the end of the period French output had regained its former lead and Spanish output 
had grown more quickly than that of anywhere else (Table 1). Rather the explanation 
for why agribusiness structures were adopted first in the UK is rooted in the 
distinctive nature of the end product in Britain. For here, unlike almost anywhere else 
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in Europe, the near universal method of distributing poultry meat was as a frozen 
chicken. As will become clear, this innovation was of critical importance in enabling 
the UK poultry industry to scale up quickly, but it was itself entirely dependent on the 
legacy of the British food industry’s refrigeration infrastructure that had been built up 
before World War Two. 
 The UK had traditionally imported vast amounts of its food, more than any 
other nation in the world, at around one third of the total consumed as late as 1937.
29
 
Before World War Two, the UK was Europe’s food importer of last resort. Those 
economies that focused on producing food for the British market, Denmark and the 
Netherlands especially, Sweden to a lesser extent, specialized on exporting butter, 
bacon and other meats. The ownership ties between London food retailers and Dutch, 
Danish and Swedish producers became ever more enmeshed.
30
 These large food 
multinationals had developed their business models around the importation of food.  
Unilever imported fats, Vestey and the Danish Bacon Company imported meat, and 
so on. Many of these imported foods required some sort of storage facilities, notably 
for frozen meat, and so the investment in cold storage within the UK, especially at 
ports, was far in advance of anything available elsewhere  in Europe.
31
 So entrenched 
in the British food supply system were these large import-oriented food companies 
that they were the most obvious candidates for organizing and co-ordinating the 
supply of food and emerging as the UK’s version of agribusiness after World War 
Two. That they did not fulfil this role, and that it was the hitherto obscure poultry 
industry that was the vanguard of agricultural reorganization, was a consequence of 
the end of Lend Lease, and so the inability of the large import-led food companies to 
operate their traditional model after the end of World War Two.  
 The 1947 Agricultural Act recognized this as a permanent change by 
introducing a system of support that ensured that British farmers would produce an 
ever greater share of British food.
32
 The British grown food product that experienced 
the greatest change under these new policy conditions was poultry farming. Yet 
paradoxically poultry was not included in the Agricultural Act’s provisions, or even 
envisaged as being one of its beneficiaries. Rather the Act’s largesse was indirectly 
received by the poultry industry.
33
 
 The first direct cause of the rise of the poultry industry in the 1950s was the 
memory of its rapid rise in the 1930s. Poultry meat consumption, particularly in 
restaurants, had then increased very quickly. Poultry meat prices had declined as a 
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direct result of the 1930s decline in world prices for grains. Frank Sykes (who, along 
with his brother Geoffrey, was one of the pioneering poultry farmers) claimed poultry 
farming ‘flourished on the low corn prices ruling before the war’.34 But then the war 
and specifically the way that wartime meat and feedstuffs rationing prioritized staple 
meats and not poultry, meant that the table poultry industry died out.
35
  
 After the 1954 derationing of meat, virtually no one was anticipating a rapid 
growth in demand for poultry. Three organisations that were willing to entertain the 
prospect between them transformed the entire industry, and so indirectly gave rise to 
the British version of agribusiness. These three organisations were Sainsburys, 
Unilever’s MacFisheries and the Co-operative Wholesale Society. Sainsburys was by 
far the most important. 
 All three were committed to retailing chicken meat. Butchers did not sell 
chicken meat in the UK in the 1950s. Instead it was multiple grocers like Sainsburys, 
or the Co-operative retail societies, or fishmongers and poulterers, of which the only 
organisation to have anything close to nationwide coverage was MacFisheries.
36
 
Butchers did not sell chicken because poultry carried a lower profit margin and 
needed to be stored at a cooler temperature than red meat. Butchers were roundly 
criticized by the British poultry interests.
37
 Multiple grocers, Co-ops, and 
MacFisheries had all earlier invested in refrigeration capacity that enabled them to 
retail chilled New York dressed chicken.
38
 The necessary retailing refrigeration 
infrastructure was in other words diffused well beyond the butchers’ chains tied to the 
big meat importing groups, or the dairy and fats retailing chains tied to their large 
importing groups.
39
 Moreover, during the mid-1950s these multiple grocers were also 
in the midst of a format revolution, as British food retailers launched themselves on 
two decades of experimentation with self service. Their early experiments were 
predictably very simple. By 1956 Sainsbury, until then a laggard, decided to adopt 
self-service. But critical to its preferred version of the format was its increasing 
investment in refrigeration capacity.
40
 Among the emerging supermarket groups a few 
were taking the self-service model to a new level by including meat and dairy 
products in refrigeration cabinets in their new versions of the format. 
 The combination of the emerging supermarkets with their enhanced 
refrigeration infrastructure, and the potential for the poultry industry to deliver a novel 
meat product that depended on suitable refrigeration infrastructure meant that there 
was an extraordinary moment between 1956 and 1959 when a few individuals were 
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able to shape the entire structure of the future poultry industry. The key decision they 
took was to prioritize frozen chicken. 
 The British decision to focus on frozen chicken was ‘a deliberate decision by 
the pioneers’.41 Unilever’s Birdseye subsidiary had already experimented with frozen 
chicken in 1954 and 1955. But its reception was muted. In 1954 less than 1 per cent of 
5 million birds were sold frozen.
42
 But by 1960 three-quarters of 100 million birds, 
and in 1961 over 80 per cent of the 140 million birds sold, were sold as frozen oven-
ready whole birds.
43
 This remarkable growth in sales was not attributable to some 
latent demand for frozen chicken among British households. The retailers were fully 
aware of consumers’ ambiguity towards it. When asked, British consumers reported a 
strong preference for fresh over frozen chicken.
44
 Moreover, British families were not 
well equipped to store frozen chicken. The diffusion of refrigerators in British 
households was relatively low and lagged behind other West European countries. 
Only 20 per cent of British households had a refrigerator in 1960, for example, and 
few of these would have had a freezer cabinet big enough to store a frozen chicken.
45
  
 This decision by suppliers to focus on frozen chicken is only explainable when 
the emerging agribusiness structure is understood. The big retailers of poultry entered 
into informal ‘understandings’ with those few chosen producers (seen in Table 3 
above) able to deliver fixed quantities of birds at certain pre-specified time points.
46
 
Such was the scale of production and the capital investment required to guarantee cost 
savings, that producers needed to be confident that would not be committing 
resources to crops that, at the point of slaughter, would be entering a market along 
with an excess supply from other producers, leading to price declines and profit 
losses. The retailers were content to keep prices stable as long as supplies were 
guaranteed. Producers therefore had a strong incentive to devise some method of 
storing temporary surplus output and so to co-ordinate the market and stabilize the 
price. Moreover, in 1958 and 1959 the leading retailers switched away from New 
York dressed to eviscerated birds. This dramatically increased poultry meat’s 
perishability when chilled, but not when frozen.
47
 The existence of a large pre-
existing refrigeration infrastructure within distribution channels in Britain meant that 
the costs of freezing chicken were more than outweighed by the benefits of improved 
price stability from co-ordinating supply. These conditions meant that developing a 
full-scale poultry industry from scratch within just a handful of years was therefore 
  12 
possible in the UK. But it still required entrepreneurs of great vision and 
organizational discipline to make it happen. 
 
IV 
Several western European countries had developed highly successful agricultural 
sectors before World War Two, as already noted above, with large multinational food 
companies dominating food processing and trading. But farming remained small 
scale, with co-operative associations having emerged in the late nineteenth century to 
organize the production and marketing of farm produce. These co-operative 
associations were overwhelmingly viewed with great admiration by agricultural 
authorities around the world. In 1961, W. T. Price, the Principal of Harper Adams 
College, pointed to the co-operative associations of the nascent EEC as providing a 
far superior model for the marketing of food than that prevailing then in the UK.
48
 
While there were substantial differences between them, there were also sufficient 
similarities in the influence and nature of co-operative associations to think of the 
Netherlands, much of Scandinavia and Germany as being more like each other than 
other European agricultural systems.
49
  
 The poultry industry of the 1950s in these European countries was, as Table 1 
indicates, relatively advanced and well developed. Poultry meat production here was 
firmly a by-product of the egg-producing sectors, several of which (the Netherlands 
and Denmark in particular) were focused on producing eggs for the British market.
50
 
By the 1950s there was an organized infrastructure in these countries that enabled 
chickens to be processed and delivered to market to meet the demand for chicken 
meat.
51
 But in all these countries the co-operative system meant that the poultry 
farmers remained independent, they contracted in open markets and their flock sizes 
remained relatively small. Despite the same access to superior US technology, the 
agricultural systems in these northern and western European nations were unable to 
take advantage of the potential benefits compared with the nascent poultry 
agribusinesses in the UK. This was because there were no actors able to coordinate 
these markets sufficiently to allow the investments required for successful broiler 
production. Even in 1961 the overwhelming majority of chicken meat sold in these 
markets was still the ‘poor types of cockerel reared by the egg producer… [and] hens 
culled from [laying flocks]’. The inferior meat from the dual purpose birds spoiled the 
market for the potential specialist chicken meat producer wanting to invest in 
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broilers.
52
 Writing for the OECD in 1961, Hunt placed the blame squarely at the ‘co-
operative tradition’, which inhibited vertical integration. The net result was much less 
concentration, far smaller businesses, a far smaller uptake of the new broiler breeds, 
much less advanced nutrition in the feeds industries, and the persistence of traditional 
slaughtering practices.
53
  
 There were variations on this theme in each of these countries of course. 
Sweden, for example, stands out as being the only European country other than the 
UK to have adopted the US model by 1960. Swedish growers were buying US strains 
for rearing from the early 1950s.
54
 The frozen food company Findus was able to 
exploit its dominant position within Sweden to make major investments in frozen 
chicken. It alone supplied 50 per cent of the Swedish market.
55
 Moreover, Sweden 
had developed self-service format in food retailing more than any other European 
nation by 1960.
56
 The Swedish Findus-led model of poultry industry was more 
concentrated, and more integrated than even in the UK by 1960. But in volume terms, 
it was tiny (Table 1).
57
 
 The West German poultry industry was certainly not tiny, and it had the 
potential to adopt US technologies and organization quickly, but it failed to do so. 
West German consumers, like Swedish and British, were quick to adopt frozen 
chicken, with over one third of German sales of chicken as frozen in 1963.
58
 These 
were retailed easily enough through the relatively advanced German food distribution 
system, where voluntary chains and co-operatives had quickly adopted the self-
service format and invested in extensive refrigeration capacity.
59
 More German 
households had refrigerators than anywhere else in Europe, with 31 per cent of West 
German households having a domestic refrigerator in 1959.
60
 Moreover, with the 
Nichols subsidiary in northern Germany, German producers had easy access to 
superior breeds. While poultry output grew quickly after World War Two, there was 
no move towards increasing scale of production and no attempts to pursue vertical 
integration among the co-operative associations in Germany at this time.
61
 When US 
frozen chicken imports to Germany increased from 1960 to 1964, German producers 
were uncompetitive and exited the market.
62
 
 Imports of frozen chicken meat from the USA were banned in the Netherlands 
and Denmark, but in these two countries the co-operative associations of farmers also 
failed to switch from traditional dual-purpose flocks to broiler chickens anything like 
as quickly as was the case in the UK, in Sweden, and, as we shall see, in Italy and 
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Spain. In both countries agricultural production was advanced. Indeed, they were the 
most advanced and commercially successful agricultural sectors in Europe. Both egg 
production and meat processing were central to both these countries’ agricultural 
systems. The Danish meat processing sector was dominated by four big co-operative 
slaughterhouses, and Dutch by a handful of large independent processors.
63
 Both 
possessed the necessary refrigeration infrastructures, but neither country had 
particularly advanced distribution systems for poultry. Despite the self-service format 
being widespread there, the Netherlands restricted poultry distribution to only 600 
poulterers, so consequently domestic consumption was low.
64
 Danish chicken meat 
production actually declined after 1964 as its livestock farmers switched into pork and 
bacon production (Table 1).
65
 
 Where Danish and Dutch firms had developed superior techniques was, 
however, in machinery production. Already by 1960 Danish and Dutch incubators and 
hatchery machinery began to be sold throughout Europe displacing US suppliers. By 
the mid-1960s the Danish and Dutch processing machinery manufacturers were 
acquiring a world leading reputation.
66
 Overall therefore Europe’s most advanced 
agricultural sectors in the late 1950s, Denmark and the Netherlands, found they were 
unable to increase broiler chicken output anything like as quickly as the UK, or Italy 
or Spain. While they were able to specialize in machinery production, broiler chicken 
flock sizes remained relatively small,  and vertical integration muted. In these 
economies agribusiness did not emerge through poultry but rather, later, through 
different agricultural sectors, with different characteristics, and hence with different 
priorities in the developing discussions within European agriculture in the 1970s and 
1980s. 
 
V 
In contrast to the economies of Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, 
France, Italy and Spain had all developed major poultry meat sectors by 1973 (Table 
1). By then these sectors were all dominated by large, vertically integrated, US-style 
agribusinesses – albeit concentration levels here did not reach the levels seen in the 
US or UK until the 1980s and 1990s.  As was the case with the UK, agribusiness 
organizational structures emerged first in France, Italy and Spain through the poultry 
sectors. The similarities in these end points disguise differences in the development 
paths.  
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 The French poultry industry in the late 1950s was clearly the largest in 
western Europe (Table 1). But it was organized around many thousands of small scale 
farmers rearing slow-growing birds for local markets, with a significant minority 
distributed through the Les Halles wholesale market in Paris.
67
 France, like elsewhere, 
had developed a sophisticated egg producing sector, especially in the northwest, 
during the inter-war period. What was novel, however, was the development of a 
French meat bird, the Bresse, in the 1930s, with its AOC awarded in 1936.
68
 The 
demand for these birds is likely to have been disproportionately influenced by the 
Parisian restaurant trade, for they were an expensive product. While French banks, 
especially Credit Agricole, had provided funds for consolidation in the 1950s, there 
was no significant move towards vertical integration until the 1970s, when a few 
Brittany-based slaughterers and feed producers (such as the Doux brothers and the 
French subsidiary of US feed producer, Ralston Purina) reorganized the poultry sector 
and adopted US methods.
69
 The French poultry industry therefore remained based 
around small scale farmers and small scale processors until the early 1970s, with little 
cold storage capacity within the distribution channels.
70
 So while output was 
relatively high, it was expensive. As competition with Dutch and British poultry 
producers began in the mid-1960s, French output fell (Table 1). French producers 
complained of being ‘sacrificed to the Common Market’.71 French distribution costs 
were high. Refrigeration infrastructure was under developed.
72
 In 1961 there were 
cold storage facilities in only 12 French cities.
73
 
 In Italy the poultry sector originated mostly with egg laying, but also from a 
traditional market for chicken meat from farmyard birds. These were reared in small 
flocks on peasant holdings and sold in local markets.
74
 Food retailing was relatively 
backward, with the smallest percentage of food shops converting to self-service in all 
Europe by 1960.
75
 Refrigeration infrastructure within the distribution channel was 
also underdeveloped compared with the UK or other western European nations.
76
 On 
the other hand, 24 per cent of all households had domestic refrigerators in 1961, 
which was relatively high for the time.
77
 
 Italian poultry meat production grew quickly from 1955 to 1960, initially 
through the expansion in the number of farmyard birds produced by many thousands 
of smallholders (Table 1). But already by the early 1960s a small number of 
innovative entrepreneurs were adopting US technologies and methods. ‘Generally 
speaking the Italian situation follows the American patterns [of integration] much 
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more closely than that of other European countries’, opined Hunt in his Survey for the  
OECD.
78
 Feed companies and hatcheries had begun to integrate by 1960. Notably the 
firm of CipZoo had adopted US techniques and methods more or less entirely. Other 
fast growing poultry firms imported machinery from the Netherlands, veterinary 
medicines via the UK subsidiaries of US pharmaceuticals firms, and US strains via 
breeding companies’ subsidiaries and franchisees in Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Germany.
79
  
 But CipZoo’s progress faltered, despite a major injection of equity by the UK 
feed company Bibby, which acquired the business in 1970. This was largely because 
Italian consumers rejected both the frozen chicken and the chilled wet chicken. It was 
not until the early-1960s, when a second company, Arena, devised a method of 
refrigerating chickens without using ice-water, that Italian consumers began to 
increase their consumption of broiler chickens substantially, enabling Arena to grow 
into Italy’s largest poultry producer. By the early 1970s the Italian industry, with 
Arena, AIA (a later entrant) and CipZoo its leading firms, was Europe’s largest 
poultry sector.
80
 
 Spanish producers also saw accelerated growth through the 1960s and 1970s. 
But unlike Italy, the growth in poultry output began from essentially nothing in the 
early 1950s. There were not even any small-scale producers in Spain at that date. This 
was because prior to the 1953 Pact of Madrid, Spanish agriculture had struggled to 
supply enough grain for human consumption and so the use of grain as animal feed 
was forbidden. After 1953 with the first US imports, there was some experimentation 
with an egg industry, and the Spanish subsidiaries of US multinational feed 
companies provided substantial technical assistance.
81
 The broiler chicken industry 
did not begin until after 1960, when restrictions on animal feeds were lifted (and then 
were fully liberalized from 1962), along with the growth in demand from the 
liberalisation of the economy, and the consequent urbanization and rise in living 
standards. Newly resident city dwellers brought with them a taste for chicken meat 
from their home-reared yard birds in the country. The Spanish poultry meat and egg 
industries began only from 1960.  Entrepreneurs imported US chicken strains (notably 
from Hubbard), imported machinery and feedstuffs, and adapted US-style vertically 
integrated organizations. Prices fell and US-style New York dressed, chilled chicken 
quickly became popular with Spanish consumers. While the costs of distribution were 
initially high (with very low diffusion of the self service format), the Spanish food 
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distribution system modernized quickly from the second half of the 1960s onwards.
82
 
With imported feed prices low, chicken meat prices quickly fell below alternative 
meat products and demand took off. Indeed the broiler became known as a cheap 
meat in Spain. In Spain, as elsewhere, the agribusiness structure first entered and 
acquired influence through the poultry sector. 
 
VI 
Considering post-war Western Europe overall, it is not wholly surprising that 
agribusiness structures first emerged in the UK. The UK remained the wealthiest 
economy after the war, with the highest standard of living and the most developed 
food industry. What surprised contemporaries was that agribusiness emerged first in 
the poultry sector. The signs had been there for a few years. Geoffrey Sykes warned 
British poultry farmers in February 1960 that if they failed to adopt big business 
practice, within a few years, either the processors or the retailers would control the 
sector.
83
 Sykes’s thinking had evolved over the previous few years. In 1955 he had 
advocated ‘co-operative ownership’ as the preferred vehicle for integration and 
capital injection in the poultry sector. But by the late 1950s he was forecasting the 
emergence of large firms.
84
  
 This occurred in poultry, as opposed to other more established sections of 
British agriculture, because of a unique set of opportunities to make a new market for 
frozen chicken.
85
 First, the roles played by the select group of retailers must be 
emphasized. Sainsburys, MacFisheries and the Co-operatives (along with several 
smaller chains) were deliberately pushing first refrigerated and then frozen produce in 
their versions of the self-service format. This proved attractive to consumers, and so 
propelled the emerging poultry farmers into positions as lead suppliers. The high 
perishability of chilled chicken and the potential for what would have been 
unacceptable levels of price volatility meant there was a strong incentive to co-
ordinate the market through informal ‘understandings’, and so to stabilize the price. 
Given the widespread presence of a cold storage infrastructure with the UK food 
distribution system, the decision to emphasize frozen chicken with consumers allowed 
retailers and producers to scale up quickly. By 1961 almost every food shop had a 
deep freezer cabinet.
86
 With such a developed cold storage infrastructure, the relative 
cost of freezing was much lower in the UK than elsewhere in Europe. In the early 
1960s the cost of storing frozen goods in Britain was less than one per cent of that in 
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France, for example.
87
 With the potential benefits from market co-ordination and 
price stability so high, the selection of frozen chicken as the product to develop when 
freezing was so cheap, was obvious. Producers had to organize production, which 
required organizational and managerial competences that few farmers possessed. It is 
noteworthy in the British case that almost all of the leading integrated poultry 
businesses were headed by owners and senior managers who had been military 
officers during or immediately after the war.
88
 It would be impossible to prove, but it 
was perhaps the organisational skills developed during military service which were to 
prove so valuable in building the poultry industry so quickly in the UK. 
 In Western Europe those countries with relatively efficient agricultural sectors 
also seemingly had many or all of the preconditions for an agribusiness-led poultry 
industry in place.  But it was the farmers here, according to Hunt, that were not 
wanting to be as forward-looking as the poultry farmer entrepreneurs in the UK, and 
so resisted the logic of agribusiness.
89
 This is a potential explanation for the 
differences in the pattern of poultry industry growth and in the adoption of 
agribusiness organization. The Netherlands and Denmark, and perhaps also Germany, 
could have developed a frozen chicken industry efficiently had farming and retail 
interests there wished to do so. The costs of cold storage are unlikely to have been 
significantly higher than in the UK. Their food retailers had largely switched to self-
service, and so, presumably, were able to accommodate frozen or chilled chicken. The 
access to domestic refrigeration in households was at least as high - if not higher - 
than in the UK. The existing level of husbandry skills among the livestock farming 
communities was also as high as in the UK (although by comparison few farming 
entrepreneurs came from military backgrounds). But the poultry industry in these 
countries failed to take off as it did in the UK, and when the agribusiness structure 
diffused here it was by a different route. The explanation that seemed most persuasive 
to contemporary investigators was that the prevalence of co-operative associations 
among farmers acted as an institutional constraint to vertical integration within broiler 
farming. Without more research, such an inference must be treated with caution. An 
alternative explanation might focus on the differences in the structure of food retailing 
and the implications for promoting poultry. Supermarkets in the Netherlands, West 
Germany and Denmark mostly emerged out of department store chains, in contrast to 
the UK, where it was multiple grocers that developed the self-service format most 
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successfully. Perhaps this difference had an impact on the relative commitment to 
refrigeration?
90
 
 By contrast the countries where the poultry industry grew most quickly, 
reached the greatest level of output by 1973, and where the agribusiness method of 
organisation became established were Italy, Spain and France. The existing sector in 
France, with its focus on a sophisticated but high cost product, may well have had to 
defer to the new broiler chicken industry that emerged later in Brittany. Currently too 
little is known (at least in the English language literature) on developments in the 
broiler chicken industry in France to be able to draw robust conclusions. Italy and 
Spain by contrast grew their broiler industries from very small beginnings. 
 But even here there were significant differences. The Spanish poultry industry 
entrepreneurs essentially adopted US-style techniques and agribusiness structures in 
their entirety. In Spain the product was similar to the US wet, chilled chicken. In Italy, 
however, where there was relatively little cold storage capacity in the distribution 
channel, the key event was when Arena began to distribute dry-chilled chicken, a 
much higher quality product, which met with immediate and widespread market 
acceptance.
91
 But neither Italian nor Spanish producers were joined by food retailers 
in any form of market co-ordination. Indeed the food retailing systems in both 
countries remained relatively backward until after this period.  
 The final conclusion therefore, for what remains an exploratory paper, seems 
to be that agribusiness emerged first in Europe through the UK poultry industry 
because of the unique circumstances there that propelled frozen chicken into the 
market as the near universal form the food took for a decade or more. In the rest of 
Europe, where frozen chicken was less popular or more expensive or both, the 
emergence of the broiler chicken sector was slower. This may have been from inertia 
imposed from the co-operative associations, or it may have been more to do with 
differences in their emerging supermarket sectors. In the UK, Italy and Spain (and 
then latterly in France), where the broiler sector grew quickly, agribusiness structures 
diffused there through the poultry industry. In those countries where the broiler sector 
grew only slowly (Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands), agribusiness 
organisations emerged through other sectors. The final conclusion must remain 
somewhat conjectural, for while we have good knowledge of the emergence of the 
broiler sectors and their organization in the UK, Italy and Spain, relatively little is 
currently known about the French, Dutch, Danish and German sectors. 
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 To return to the article’s start-point, had Khrushchev remained vigilant for the 
interests of the Soviet poultry sector, what would he have concluded from this 
institutional complexity that either promoted or retarded the diffusion of the modern 
broiler chicken strains, like the Cobb? Soviet poultry farming was organized around 
large collectivist farms, with ties to leading research centres. While the Soviet farms 
had little concern with efficient marketing and price volatility, they had acquired 
considerable expertise in breeding and rearing livestock. As Table 1 shows, Soviet 
poultry output quickly recovered its position as European leader. By 1973 Soviet 
output was twice its 1964 level. While this growth in meat output was based on 
imported strains (notably Dutch breeds), it is noteworthy that the Soviet sector 
retained its preference for dual-purpose birds. Perhaps in consequence, its broiler 
production remained very inefficient by comparison to US and West European norms. 
The diffusion of the agribusiness structure in the leading broiler producing countries 
in Europe appeared, in other words, to have led by 1973 to significant gains in relative 
efficiency over the USSR, not primarily through technological advantages but instead 
through the marketing imperative to reduce price volatility.
92 
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Table 1. Chicken Meat Output in Selected European Nations, 1956-1973 (tonnes)  
 
 
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
                   USSR           813000 822000 802000 606000 696000 745000 764000 817000 866000 1071000 1183000 1237000 1295000 
France   225000 265000 305000 350000 439000 458000 494000 531000 555000 389500 401350 404800 494572 523357 535678 588174 618344 
United 
Kingdom 139000 157000 179000 229000 275000 294000 307000 306000 326000 341000 369000 402000 456200 477500 494800 501000 556800 552000 
Italy 84000 98700 140000 180000 221600 246700 292600 341400 410400 490100 527500 507100 528700 535900 561000 543000 579000 641000 
Germany   80000 88000 96000 124000 150100 150200 164000 185400 192000 213400 240400 250000 267800 299100 326600 327200 366800 
Netherlands   47600 56200 70400 70000 84000 98413 104800 127598 150650 183000 206000 220000 245000 292000 319000 328000 339000 
Spain   12000 12000 12500 13000 79100 107200 185000 210600 231400 302600 350350 347540 382800 496000 474000 551000 597000 
Denmark 24000 23000 35000 45000 60750 76500 84000 77600 90100 78100 60300 58500 56500 60700 70100 70900 75800 80100 
Belgium-
Luxembourg 
 
44500 48700 54000 
 
70212 80481 81399 85979 92012 95928 99465 101316 102774 112102 111611 109901 114814 
Sweden   10335 10900 11800   19000 17000 19000 18800 20200 20600 26400 27800 26000 24500 25500 29700 33000 
 
Note: the order of nations is by output in 1961, the first year of the United Nations series of data. The nations listed are the nine leading 
producers of chicken meat in West Europe in 1973, along with the USSR, for the purposes of comparison. Were the table to include other 
East European nations, then Poland, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia all attained higher output than Sweden in 
1961, and so would be included.  
 
Sources: For all years from 1961 onwards: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAOSTAT) 
http://faostat3.fao.org/home/index.html. Prior to 1961 figures are for chicken meat: from this date onwards, the table gives figures for 
all poultry meat. Data for earlier years is drawn as follows. 
France: 1960 from OECD, Survey, 1961, p. 116 (deadweight uneviscerated). 1957 inferred from Talbot, Chicken, p. 12 (Talbot states that 
French output was almost half EEC6 output in 1957) and OECD, Survey, for the output of the other EEC6 nations. 1958-60 values are 
straight-line (SL) interpolations to the nearest 5000.  
Netherlands:  OECD, Survey, p. 145, reports liveweight totals for 1957-9. These have been deflated to 80% (following the formula 
reported on p. 125). Note this broadly agrees with Talbot, Chicken, p. 12, which states Dutch output doubled between 1957-1961. 
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Germany: OECD, Survey, p. 125 for 1957-59. 1960 is a SL interpolation. 
Spain: Clar, email to author 12 July 2013, with 1957 SL interpolation for 1954 (unreported here) and 1960 observations. 
UK: Richardson, Poultry, Table II for pre-war, 1946/7, and 1953/4 values. 1957-60 values all from OECD, Survey, p. 172. 
Italy:  Tessari  and Godley, ‘Poultry’, Table 2 for 1957 and 1960. 1958 and 1959 are SL interpolations. 1956 is also a SL interpolation 
between 1955 (not reported here) and 1957. 1955 value from OECD, Survey, p. 142. 
Denmark: OECD, Survey, p. 105, Table. II – ‘Disposal’ - includes all poultry - for 1956-59. 1960 value is a SL interpolation. 
Sweden: OECD, Survey, p. 156 for 1958-59. 
Belgium: OECD, Survey, p. 98 - all poultry.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Broiler Output, 1957-63 in Selected European Nations (‘000 tonnes) 
 
 
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 
         UK 51 60 73 113 138 220.5 
  DK 
 
1.9 6 13 
    D  
   
16.3 
    ITA 
  
20 46.8 70.9 93.7 128.7 170.7 
NL 
 
15.6 22.3 29.2 
 
40 
  SWE 
  
1.2 2 2.7 
   SPA 
      
64.3 133.2 
 
Source: OECD, Survey, 1961 and Table 1. Italian data deflated after consultation with Alessandra Tessari (email with author 25 Sept. 
2013), where broilers actually 20% of total in 1958 rising (in equal increments) to 80% by 1968. Using total output from table 1 this 
produces the figures used here. 
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Table 3. Consolidation in the UK Poultry Industry, 1961-70.  
 
 
Entrant Existing related subsidiaries Investment 
Ross Ross Foods – frozen fish and 
vegetables 
1961: acquired Sterling Poultry 
Products. 1962: acquired 
Spinks, Faribairn and Chunky 
Chicks (Nichols) 
Fitch Lovell Food Retailing - Key Markets 1962: Fitch Lovell Poultry  
Fatstock Marketing 
Corporation 
None - but strong relations 
with Co-operative Wholesale 
Society 
1962: Processing station 
Spillers Supplied animal feeds, but no 
direct interests 
1962: purchased 20 per cent 
holding in Buxted  
Vestey family/ 
Union International 
Group 
Dewhirsts & Eastman butchers 
& two processing stations 
1963: Acquired 50 per cent 
holding in Sun Valley 
Bibby & Co Supplied animal feeds, but no 
direct interests 
1963: acquired a minority 
holding in J. P. Wood 
(Midland Poultry Holdings) 
J & B Eastwood Eggs 1964: built broiler division 
Nitrovit Supplied animal feeds, but no 
direct interests 
1964: acquired the Spiller’s 
minority holding in Buxted. 
Allied British 
Foods (Weston 
family interests) 
none 1968: Acquired Ross and 
renamed it Allied Farm Foods 
Unilever Birdseye (frozen food), 
BOCM (animal feeds), 
Macfisheries (food retailing) 
1968: J&P Woods (Midland 
Poultry Holdings) 
Imperial none 1969: acquired Allied Farm 
Foods (Ross) and 1970: 
acquired Buxted. 
 
Sources: in general reports in Poultry Farmer and Packer, passim, in particular Ross, 
5 Sept. 1962 and 8 May 1963; Bibby and J. P. Wood, 5 June 1963; Fitch-Lovell, 24 
Oct. 1962 (p. 29); the Eastwood diversification, 5 Sept. 1962; Vestey-Sun Valley, 27 
Mar. 1963; Spiller-Buxted, 1962, and Nitrovit-Buxted: Economist 15 Feb. 1964. 
Additional content from: Fitch Lovell: Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 
Linfood Holdings plc and Fitch Lovell plc – a report on the proposed merger 1983 
(HMRC, London), pp. 19-20; Unilever – J & P Wood see Ted Burnham obituary, 
Farmers Weekly 15 Sept. 2010 
(http://www.fwi.co.uk/articles/15/09/2010/123976/ted-burnham-1924-2010.htm); and 
for the shortlived Weston family involvement in the broiler industry and subsequent 
entry by Imperial, see Trelford, Holroyd and Wells, History, p. 171.  
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Figure 1.  European chicken meat output, selected nations, 1956-63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: drawn from Table 1. 
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